

Online Appendix for Chapter 4: Class, Attitudes, and Choices

Regression Models with Controls for Variables Summarized in Figure 4.3

Table A.11. Regression models relating class and legislator opinion, controlling for other factors

	1	2	3
<i>Data set</i>	<i>American Representation Study</i>	<i>State Legislative Survey</i>	<i>Political Courage Test</i>
<i>Variable range</i>	0–7	1–5	0,1
<i>Profit-oriented professions</i>			
Technical professional	1.15 (1.43)	0.18 ⁺ (0.10)	0.78 (0.90)
Business owner/ executive	1.48 (0.94)	0.24* (0.11)	0.48 (0.76)
Business employee	1.07 (0.74)	0.40** (0.10)	0.20 (0.85)
Farm owner/ manager	1.49 (1.46)	0.35** (0.11)	n/a
<i>Not-for-profit professions</i>			
Politics/military	0.72 (1.02)	0.16 (0.12)	–0.13 (0.97)
Lawyer (omitted category)	—	—	—
Service-based professional	0.20 (0.94)	–0.11 (0.12)	0.26 (0.79)
<i>Working-class jobs</i>			
Worker	–1.08 (0.88)	n/a	n/a
<i>N</i>	146	1,588	165
<i>R</i> ²	0.6981	0.4298	0.2259

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two tailed. Standard errors are clustered by legislator. Coefficients for the control variables and the intercept are not displayed. Lawyers are the omitted reference group.

Models 1 and 2 are OLS models, and Model 3 is a logistic regression.

Regression Models Summarized in Figure 4.4

Table A.12. Regression models relating class and social welfare voting in the 85th and 86th Houses (1957–60)

	1	2	3
<i>Controls</i>	No controls	Standard controls	Stand. & legislator's econ prefs.
<i>Profit-oriented professions</i>			
Technical professional	1.51 (1.98)	1.15 (1.43)	0.11 (0.84)
Business owner/executive	1.87 ⁺ (1.11)	1.48 (0.94)	0.17 (0.69)
Business employee	0.42 (0.94)	1.07 (0.74)	0.91 ⁺ (0.51)
Farm owner/manager	-0.66 (1.46)	1.49 (1.46)	1.87* (0.90)
<i>Not-for-profit professions</i>			
Politics/military	0.27 (1.17)	0.72 (1.02)	1.44* (0.72)
Lawyer (omitted category)	—	—	—
Service-based professional	-1.87* (0.81)	0.20 (0.94)	2.02** (0.70)
<i>Working-class jobs</i>			
Worker	-3.09** (0.59)	-1.08 (0.88)	0.36 (0.84)
<i>N</i>	190	146	146
<i>R</i> ²	0.1023	0.6981	0.8441

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two tailed. Standard errors are clustered by legislator. Coefficients for the control variables and the intercept are not displayed. Lawyers are the omitted reference group.

Regression Models Summarized in Figure 4.7

Table A.13. OLS models relating class and social welfare voting in the 85th and 86th Houses (1957–60)

	1	2	3	4
<i>Controls</i>	Stand. & groups legislator considers	Stand. & percep. of business	Stand. & percep. of labor	Stand. & percep. of constit.
<i>Profit-oriented professions</i>				
Technical professional	0.61 (1.46)	2.32 (1.89)	1.64 (1.57)	0.52 (1.54)
Business owner/executive	1.26 (0.89)	2.58* (1.03)	1.76+ (0.98)	0.38 (0.68)
Business employee	0.92 (0.69)	1.13 (0.69)	1.43* (0.68)	1.08 (0.75)
Farm owner/manager	1.12 (1.69)	2.25 (1.58)	1.69 (1.40)	1.89 (1.58)
<i>Not-for-profit professions</i>				
Politics/military	0.05 (0.94)	0.89 (1.10)	0.64 (1.11)	-0.45 (0.80)
Lawyer (omitted category)	—	—	—	—
Service-based professional	0.86 (0.90)	0.47 (1.21)	0.31 (1.20)	-0.44 (0.74)
<i>Working-class jobs</i>				
Worker	-0.90 (1.06)	-2.78+ (1.58)	-0.95 (1.21)	-1.27 (1.11)
<i>N</i>	146	137	141	131
<i>R</i> ²	0.7359	0.7523	0.7323	0.7926

Note: + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two tailed. Standard errors are clustered by legislator. Coefficients for the control variables and

the intercept are not displayed. Lawyers are the omitted reference group.